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• Historical summary of naval surface combat 
systems
• Transition to joint perspective
• C2 problems
• C2 solutions
• The Way ahead
• One thing about the 
Military Team…
• Somebody is always 
ready to support 
your efforts with a 
pat on the back…
Command and Control - The KEY to Military 
Capability




(DOD, NATO) A combination of one or more 
weapons with all related equipment, materials, 
services, personnel, and means of delivery and 
deployment (if applicable) required for self-
sufficiency
Fletcher Class DD 445-517 Sumner Class DD 694-760
Brownson Class DD 518-693 Gearing Class DD 761-804
117 Square Bridge Destroyers
58 Round Bridge Destroyers
5” Twin Mounts on 67 Destroyers
43 Wider/Longer Twin Mount Destroyers
Combat System Spiral Development over the next 25 years
The Aegis weapons system is a surface-to-air 
integrated weapons system. It is designed to 
defend the fleet against any airborne threat. 
The heart of the Aegis system is the AN/SPY-1 
Phased-array radar system coupled with the 
AN/UYK-1/7/43 high-speed computer system. 
This combination is able to detect incoming 
missiles or aircraft, sort them by assigning a 
threat value, assign on-board Standard 
surface-to-air missiles, and guide the missiles 
to their targets. 
Aegis Combat System
Phased arrays switch rapidly and cover the entire 
azimuth around the ship in near real time (seconds)
Aegis Spiral Development
•VLS, Tomahawk Weapons System, ASW System Upgrades
•The AN/SPY-1B radar and AN/UYK-43/44 computers with 
superset computer programs
•Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) 
Command and Control Processor, Tactical Data Information 
Link 16, Combat Direction Finding, Tactical Data Information 
Exchange System, AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Active Electronic Counter 
Countermeasures, and AEGIS Extended Range (ER) Missile 
•Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) and Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC) 
•Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT), Advanced Display 
System, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) 




Baseline 7 Phase 1C computer program
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
Vertical Launch System (VLS) modifications
Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM)
Vertical launch antisubmarine rocket (VLA)
Mark 34 gun weapons system, including the Mark 160 Mod 11 gun
computer system and the 5-inch/62-caliber gun with Extended








Transition to Joint Thinking
Title 10 U.S.C.  It’s the law!
National Security Strategy
National Military Strategy
Unified Command Plan (every two years)
Forces For Combatant Commanders (every 2 years)
Transformation Planning Guidance (2004-2006)
Strategic Planning Guidance (2006-2011)
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) CJCSI 3170.1 







• Services and Defense Agencies were not structured to 
organize, train, and equip Joint Command and Control (C2) 
capabilities
• No overarching Joint Operational Concepts and 
Integrated Architectures have existed to guide and capture 
JBMC2 mission area requirements and capability priorities
• Services and Defense Agencies control resource 
allocation, so their requirements have been funded ahead of 
joint requirements
• Combatant Commanders insufficiently integrated into the 
requirements, acquisition, and PPBE process
• There has been no single authority to ensure Joint C2 
capabilities are integrated to meet Combatant Commander 
warfighting requirements  
Historic Problems
(From: JTF C2 Operational Concept Study/JLLs)
Problem Set
• Interoperability shortfalls hamper C2, ISR, & Joint Fires
• Lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs)
• Lack of standard tactics, techniques, & procedures (TTPs) 
• Ad Hoc JTF activation and augmentation
• No standards for JTF leadership or C2 personnel
• No standard deployable JTF C2 facilities 
• Situation awareness shortfall across battlespace
• Missing decision support & info management tools
Did not view C2 as an integrated weapon system
Results of Problem Set
• Lack of standard tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) 
• Ad Hoc JTF activation and augmentation
• Interoperability shortfalls 
• No standards for JTF leadership or C2 personnel
• No standard deployable JTF C2 facilities 
• Missing decision support & info management tools
Requires improvements; a change in focus for 
C2…what we at JFCOM call Joint Battle Management 
Command and Control (JBMC2)  – (What IS That…?)
Command and Control
Joint definition:
The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission.  
C2 functions are performed through an arrangement 
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures employed by a commander in the 
planning, directing, coordination, and controlling 
forces and operations in the accomplishment of the 
mission…that is the essence of JBMC2
Knowledge Management Concept!
























Service elements today can deploy, employ, create effects quicker 
than Joint Force Commander can “command and control” them!
Command and Control







ALL are too slow 
and inefficient
• The need for JTF Readiness
• Combat Units Train the Way They will Fight
• They are ready 
• JTF HQ’s rarely train the Way They Will Fight
• Service HQ’s challenged to sustain readiness
• Technology is available now to enable more rapid, 
effective planning, decision-making and execution
• Collaborative environment drives both C2 processes and 
organizational changes
• Net-centric OPS require a new level of proficiency
• Increases HQ personnel readiness requirement 
• Capability shortfalls in decision-making, execution 
and assessment throughout the battlespace





















































• For any crisis, all Combatant Commanders must:
• Execute command and control functions
• Plan and execute using provided forces
• Coordinate with the national agencies
• Rely on the ISR forces/sources/agencies
• Receive guidance from national authorities
• Perform crisis action planning
• Perform assessment functions
• Execute force deployment/redeployment
• Employ national strategic capabilities
• Execute Information Operations
• Employ  SOF forces / “special” capabilities
• Coordinate with / employ multinational forces
• Rely on supporting commands
• Be ready to execute Joint C2 
Common Capability Requirements 
Drive JBMC2 Focus
Where Should We Focus?
 Culture Change- adaptability, flexibility
 Net-Centric Operational Concepts
 Operational Architectures – Integrated
 Integrated Capabilities
 Standards & Interoperability
Data
 Interfaces (Software and Hardware)
Processors - Platforms





• New level of Interdependence & Mutual Dependence
• Speed of Command – but only if we adapt
• Organize, Train & Equip – vert & horiz
• Quality and Speed of decisions – the importance of:
• Shared Awareness
• Large scale vert & horiz collaboration
• Linking sensors to decision makers & shooters
• Tactics, Techniques & Procedures - important as ever
• NCW = Both a Capability and an Operational Concept
• Means to an end – e.g. Effects Based Operations
• Knowledge Management will be key 
Implications of Net-Centric Warfare
• Exploiting new ways of operating 
• We tend to adapt new technologies to old ways of 
doing business – inability to see new possibilities
• The science of decision-making – across battlespace
• Peaking decision-making via “info superiority”
• Linking activities in a Global Information Environment
• Expansion of operating realm to Virtual Arena
• Coherent roadmaps for transforming the force 
• Migration & integration of legacy & net-centric
• Ensuring capability as we transform
• Training – Training – Training 
• Still the key to dominance in an IT “equalized” world
Challenges
Transformation Leaders in JBMC2
 Standing Joint Force Headquarters
 Collaborative Information Environments
 Deployable Joint Command and Control
 Netted Joint Forces
 Integrated Joint Fires
 Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
 Advanced Concepts 
Effects Based Operations (EBO), 
Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
C4ISR – an obsolete term?
JBMC2- the new paradigm?
Command and Control
Two fundamental components of C2:
Basic processes
• observing, observing,  planning, deciding, 
executing
Collaboration ( It’s a people thing!)
• processes people do among themselves in 
sharing information, planning, and analyzing to 
make better decisions
Collaboration
Definition: (v.) To work together, especially in 
a joint effort.
A step beyond communication:
 deliberate association of people
 common goal
 share/enrich information
 executing processes more efficiently/effectively
 decision enhancement
 enabled by ability to communicate
TEAMWORK….. duh!
Recommendations
• Remove the outmoded term C4ISR from 
military vernacular
• Return to the terms “C2” and “ISR” as specific 
enabling functions for functional capabilities 
across warfare
• Adopt JBMC2 as the new overarching concept 
of integrated C2 within all the functional 
capabilities of warfare
• Assign responsibility for JBMC2 to a Unified 
Combatant Commander in UCP
Which … focuses on Cdr’s intent
- An in-place capability for seamless planning and execution
- Able to operate across the spectrum of conflict 
SJFHQ Organization 

















• A standing joint team capable of executing transformational 
command and control functions from pre-crisis to crisis 
termination – through the exploitation of information age 
communications, equipment, organization and procedures. 
• This team is skilled in the employment of advanced 
warfighting concepts in the direction, coordination, and 











M agement  
• With:
• In-place systems architecture with collaborative tools and reachback 
• Inherent understanding of RCC/strategic-level policy & perspective
• Knowledge and understanding of the area of operations, key issues 
and “players”
• In-place continuity for seamless planning and execution 











•An in-place, coherently joint team, experienced in:
• Joint operations & doctrine
• Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning
• Joint Force command and control functions and processes to employ 
advanced warfighting concepts in joint fires, joint ISR, etc.
• Building and exploiting an Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
• Planning and executing Effects Based Operations (EBO)
• Functional SOPs, TTPs for execution within collaborative environment
• Ability to exploit collaborative tools/processes in the joint planning 
and decision-making process
• Service Doctrine & TTPs
Deliverable Capabilities









•Modern HQ workstation is 
too complex to employ on 
a walk-in basis
•Switchology equivalent to 
several weapons 
systems; e.g. cockpit, 
CIC, etc.
•Requires both initial and 
proficiency training
Future Joint Force Command and Control
People and Processes
Not ad hoc
Standing, trained, ready team
SOPs/TTPs for info age C2
Skilled in latest joint planning, 
decision tools/processes 
Skilled in joint operations & doctrine
Service Doctrine & TTPs 
Skilled in employment of advanced 
joint warfighting concepts
Skills to rapidly gain situational 
awareness and understanding
Rapid establishment of JTF/HQs
Faster planning and execution




Business rules to enable processes
Common operational picture
Access to databases











unity of command 
and unity of effort
Able to “Command and Control” joint forces 
employing advanced warfighting concepts
• Knowledge centric, cross functionally organized, 
standing Joint Team …
• Designed to develop, practice and integrate joint, 
interagency, multinational operations  
• With a systems-of systems understanding of the 
battlespace -- pre crisis and continually updated 
during execution
• Enabled by a pre – established,  distributed, 
collaborative network to increase a Commander’s 
range of options to respond to crisis situations
What SJFHQ brings to the “Fight”
Collaborative Information 
Environment
• Most significant info age impact on Joint C2
• Key driver in transforming Joint C2
• Critical for both planning and execution
• Drives both C2 processes & organizational changes
• Requires skill, thorough training & proficiency
• Technology is available to move out now
• But must have interoperable tools & procedures
• Separate, ad hoc approaches risk effectiveness
• Incompatible standards and procedures are the result
• SJFHQ will foster global stds. & procedures in CIE and 
employment of CIE capabilities
(An Inevitable C2 Requirement)
Summary
• Train JTF staffs with a standard set of communication, 
information management and collaboration 
equipment/tools (DJC2 and then JC2)
• Standardize equipment TTPs, equipment, personnel, 
processes for all JTF staffs, regardless of AOR (SJFHQ).
• Each Component staff in the RCC should be enabled 
…..the joint question????
If we do all the above , we have effectively made C2 a 
weapon system by the DOD/NATO definition.
